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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950720-CA 
Priority No. 2 
The state addresses Defendant/Appellant Christopher 
Cheeney's ("Cheeney") challenges to the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) on two basic grounds: the state 
asserts Cheeney's challenges were not preserved (or were waived) 
in the trial court; and the state asserts the statute is 
sufficiently clear and workable to overcome the constitutional 
challenges, yet strains to identify how a violation of the 
statute is established -- whether it is (i) under a strict 
liability standard or (ii) with evidence that the defendant had 
the culpable mental state to act in concert with two or more 
persons in the commission of the underlying offense. The tension 
between the standards underscores a basic vagueness problem with 
the statute. 
POINT I. THE STATE'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES EMPHASIZE 
THE AMBIGUITY OF SECTION 76-3-203.1. 
A. THE STATE'S INTERPRETATION OF "IN CONCERT CONDUCT" 
UNDER A STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD CREATES AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION. 
Under Section 76-3-203.1, a defendant's penalty is enhanced 
for certain predicate offenses if the defendant committed the 
offense(s) "in concert with two or more persons." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1) (a) (1995). According to the state, a bright 
line test or strict liability standard is applied under that 
provision, relieving the prosecutor of the burden of proving the 
defendant had the culpability to commit the predicate offense 
with others. The state relies on State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 
(Utah 1989) (enhanced penalty for committing offense within 1000 
feet of public school), State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1994) (state is not required to prove culpability of other 
alleged actors under gang enhancement), and McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (enhanced penalty for visible 
possession of a firearm), in support of that proposition. Those 
cases are inapposite. 
In Moore, 782 P.2d at 4 97, the defendant was charged and 
convicted of distribution of a controlled substance for value 
within 1000 feet of a public school in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended) and was given an enhanced 
sentence pursuant to the strict liability provisions set forth in 
subsection (5)(a)-(d)-1 To prove the distance between the 
location of the crime and the public school, the state was 
required to employ a bright line test, which took into 
consideration only the objectively measured distance from the 
location where the act occurred to the public school grounds, 
Moore, 782 P.2d at 502-03. Obviously, such a bright line test 
1
 Subsection (5) (d) states: "It is not a defense to a prosecution 
under this subsection that the actor mistakenly believed . . . that the 
location where the act occurred was not as described in subsection (5) (a) 
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described 
in subsection (5)(a)." Moore, 782 P.2d at 504. 
2 
cannot be applied under Section 76-3-203.1; "in concert" conduct 
is not a theory susceptible to the tidy laws of geometry. In 
addition, under Utah law, the strict liability standard applies 
only when the statute defining the offense expressly so states, 
as reflected in Section 58-37-8. See State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 
727, 728-29 n.3 (Utah 1984). 
According to the state, the court in Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 
450, "implicitly rejected the proposition that in order for 
Utah's [Section 76-3-203.1] 'in concert' enhancement to apply, 
the defendant's actions in concert with others must be attended 
by any mens rea besides that required for the predicate offense -
- in that case, intentional murder." (Brief of Appellee, dated 
April 2, 1996 ("Br. Appellee"), at 13.) That assertion is 
incorrect. The Alvarez court expressly rejected the proposition 
that persons with whom the criminal defendant "acted in concert 
must be parties to the offense . . . and possess the [culpable] 
mental state required for that offense." Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 
450. The court specifically recognized that the defendant's 
intent to commit a crime "in concert" is determined "by his own 
mental state," id., after all, the defendant suffers the enhanced 
penalty if "in concert" conduct is established. The state would 
have this Court construe Alvarez as the last word on "in concert" 
conduct; however, it is the starting place. The logical 
extension of Alvarez is to require the state to prove that the 
defendant specifically intended and planned to commit the 
predicate offense "in concert" with two or more persons. 
3 
To its credit, the state recognized that McMillan, 477 U.S. 
at 79, is not the last word on due process rights afforded a 
defendant when considering the state's chosen course of defining 
crimes and prescribing penalties. "[W]hile the Court in McMillan 
acknowledged that a situation might arise wherein due process law 
would require a court to disregard a statutory disclaimer of 
intent to create a separate offense, it found no reason to do so 
in that case." (Br. Appellee at 9.) In fact, the Supreme Court 
in McMillan recognized "there are constitutional limits to the 
State's power in [defining crimes and prescribing penalties]; in 
certain limited circumstances [In re] Winship's reasonable-doubt 
requirement applies to facts not formally identified as elements 
of the offense charged." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86 (emphasis 
added).2 Section 76-3-203.1 is one of the McMillan limited 
As set forth in note 5 of Cheeney's opening brief, the Court in 
McMillan, recognized the following: Before imposing the enhanced firearm 
penalty, the trial court was required under the Pennsylvania statute to 
consider evidence presented at trial and additional evidence offered by 
either party that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the 
commission of the felony offense. The trial court "simply took one 
factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on 
punishment -- the instrumentality used in committing a violent felony --
and dictated the precise weight to be given that factor if the 
instrumentality is a firearm." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90. Like the 
statute in Moore, 782 P.2d at 497, the Pennsylvania provision required 
the fact finder to consider a simple proposition -- whether the physical 
property of a firearm was in the defendant's possession. 
A finding of "in concert" conduct does not lend itself to such 
simple propositions. Thus, a workable standard must be superimposed to 
ensure fairness and due process. 
In addition, unlike "visible possession of a firearm", "in concert" 
conduct is not an aggravating factor traditionally considered in Utah for 
enhancement purposes. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25.1 (1995), 
a juvenile shall be bound over and held to answer criminal charges as an 
adult in district court unless the juvenile court judge finds certain 
conditions are met, including "that if the offense was committed with one 
or more other persons, the juvenile appears to have a lesser degree of 
(continued...) 
4 
circumstances -- the Court should disregard the statutory 
disclaimer that Section 76-3-203.1 does not create a separate 
offense, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (a) (1995), since the 
phrase "in concert" must be construed to require proof of a 
culpable mental state. 
In a separate phase of its strict-liability-standard 
argument, the state claims it is "illogical" to engraft a mens 
rea element into the statute because Section 76-3-203.1 requires 
"a mens rea of at least recklessness." (Br. Appellee at 12.) 
The state apparently is arguing the following: unless an offense 
specifically defines the mens rea that must be proven, the 
"mental state is at least recklessness" (id. (the state cites to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1995))); Cheeney has asked this Court 
to superimpose a specific intent element of "knowing" conduct, 
"unity of purpose" or "design" to prove "in concert" conduct (id. 
at 11); because recklessness is not a sufficient mens rea, 
Cheeney's request is "illogical." (Id. at 12.) The state's 
disjointed argument is misplaced. 
Consistent with this Court's duties to ensure fairness in 
the criminal code and to promote justice, a specific intent 
element of "purpose", "conscious action", "intent", and 
2
 (. ..continued) 
culpability than the co-defendants." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-
25.1 (3) (b) (ii) (1995). In that context, the "in concert" conduct 
provision serves to save the juvenile from being subjected to the harsher 
sentences that are handed down in the adult system. Likewise, the Utah 
Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule, a copy of which is attached as Addendum "1", 
identifies the traditional mitigating/aggravating circumstances consider-
ed by Utah courts in determining sentences. Of the circumstances identi-
fied, the following clearly infers that the defendant's part in concerted 
activity is relevant: whether "offender acted under strong provocation." 
An affirmative answer is considered in mitigation of the sentence. 
5 
"knowledge" must be superimposed where necessary, as reflected in 
State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045-46 (Utah 1984). In that 
case the Utah Supreme Court considered the second degree murder 
statute, which states an actor has committed "criminal homicide" 
if one of four alternative conditions exists. The third 
alternative, the depraved indifference provision, stated: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second 
degree if the actor: . . . 
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, [ ] engaged in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another and 
thereby causes the death of another; . . . . 
Id. Because the provision did not specify a particular mental 
state, id. ("reference to 'depraved indifference' does not denote 
a subjective mental state"), the court superimposed the 
appropriate culpable mental state: 
Since depraved indifference second degree murder does 
not expressly specify a particular mental state, the 
culpable mental state required by the statute must be 
as provided in Sec. 76-2-102: "Every offense not 
involving strict liability shall require a culpable 
mental state, and when the definition of the offense 
does not specify a culpable mental state, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility." We must therefore determine 
which of these three mental states is superimposed on 
the depraved indifference provision by Sec. 76-2-102. 
This effort is prescribed by our statutory duty to 
construe the provisions of the Criminal Code "according 
to the fair import of their terms to promote justice 
and to effect the . . . general purposes of section 76-
1-104" to " [d]efine adequately the conduct and mental 
state which constitute each offense" and to 
"[p]rescribe penalties which are proportionate to the 
seriousness of offenses . . . ." Sees. 76-1-106; 76-1-
104 (2) & (3) . 
At the outset, we rule out "recklessness." . . . [That 
term was deleted by amendment from an earlier enactment 
of the statute. The deletion "makes it clear that 
reckless conduct is not sufficient to prove the offense 
6 
of murder in the second degree."] 
The context of the depraved indifference provision 
persuades us to rule out "intent" as the culpable 
mental state. . . . [The reading of "intentionally" 
into the statute would transform second degree murder 
into conduct that would constitute only manslaughter or 
negligent homicide.] 
In contrast to the two unacceptable alternatives, the 
third mental state specified by Sec. 76-2-102, 
"knowledge," fits perfectly into the sense of Sec. 76-
5-203(1) (c) . It is clear from the structure, purpose, 
and history of the depraved indifference provision that 
the required culpable mental state (which we hold to be 
"knowledge") refers to the nature of the actor's con-
duct or to the circumstance surrounding it, or both; it 
does not refer to the result produced by that conduct. 
Thus, under our interpretation, the culpable mental 
state prescribed by statute for depraved indifference 
homicide is the sensible requirement that the defendant 
acted with knowledge that his conduct created a grave 
risk of death to another. 
Id. at 1045-47 (emphasis added and citations omitted); see also 
Spitz v. Municipal Court of City of Phoenix, 621 P.2d 911 (Ariz. 
1980) (court will adopt criminal intent element unless 
legislature has stated strict liability standard); Exotic Coins, 
Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1985) (legislative silence on 
element of intent is not to be construed as an indication that no 
culpable mental state is required for violation to be proved). 
Consistent with Fontana, the inclusion of a culpable mental 
state, such as "unity of purpose", "design" between the defendant 
and the two or more other persons, "conscious action", "intent", 
and "knowledge," is a sensible requirement for proving "in 
concert" conduct. As set forth in Appellant's Brief, sister 
jurisdictions, which the state rejects as "nonbinding" (Br. 
Appellee at 12), require such a showing. (Brief of Appellant, 
7 
dated February 16, 1996 ("Br. Appellant") at 17.) 
Indeed, this Court looked to sister state law in a civil 
case for assault and battery where proof of joint liability, i.e. 
"in concert" conduct, was in issue. In D.D.Z. v. Molerway 
Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this 
court ruled that joint liability could not be proved against 
joint defendants based on their mere presence at the time and 
place of the battery. Rather, the plaintiff must show "in 
concert" conduct, i.e. "common design," or that the joint 
defendants provided encouragement or assistance to others. Id. 
(citing Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822, 823 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); 
Restatement (2d) of Torts § 876 (Persons Acting in Concert)); see 
also, Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 293 P.2d 700, 702, 709 
(Utah 1956) (Jones and Wade, JJ., in separate opinions 
recognizing that concerted action is shown if preconceived common 
design and purpose exist); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995) 
(Conspiracy -- "a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, 
intending that conduct constituting a crime be preformed, agrees 
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of 
such conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in 
pursuance of the conspiracy . . . " ) . 
"Intent", "purpose" and "knowledge," to design, scheme and 
plan fit perfectly into the sense of § 76-3-203.1. It is clear 
from the structure, purpose, and use of the phrase "in concert" 
conduct that the state should be required to prove such a 
culpable mental state (in addition to that which must be proved 
for the predicate offense) before Section 76-3-203.1 may be 
8 
applied to enhance a penalty. Any other conclusion would create 
a strict liability presumption that the actors consciously and 
intentionally acted together, which presumption has long since 
been condemned as inappropriate and unconstitutional by the 
United States Supreme Court. See McFarland v. American Sugar 
Rfcr. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916) (cited in McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87). 
B. THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO 
SUPERIMPOSE A SPECIFIC INTENT ELEMENT INTO THE STATUTE. 
In a half-hearted attempt to address the issues raised as a 
result of the ambiguity of the statue, the state asserts, "[E]ven 
if this Court accepted Cheeney's argument that the 'in concert' 
enhancement requires a separate mens rea from the predicate 
offense, it would not follow that such mens rea can only be found 
by full trial-type procedures." (Br. Appellee at 14.) As a 
prelude to that assertion, the state admits that in order to 
create a substantive offense the statute must contain a mens rea 
element (id. at 11 and 12), and that "trial-type" safeguards 
"must be employed if section 76-3-203.1 creates a substantive 
offense." (Id. at 9.) Thus, "if this Court accepted Cheeney's 
argument that the 'in concert' enhancement requires a separate 
mens rea from the predicate offense" (id. at 14), the state must 
concede that such an element (together with the actus rea: the 
commission of the underlying offense and the existence of "two or 
more persons") creates a substantive offense mandating use of 
"trial-type" safeguards. (Id. at 9, 11, and 12.) 
The state next asserts that because "[c]riminal courts 
routinely find facts [1] necessary for the admission of evidence 
9 
without jury assistance, and [2] by proof standards below the 
'reasonable doubt' standard" (Br. Appellee at 14) ,3 it is not 
necessary to treat a mens rea element in a sentencing provision 
differently. The state fails to explain how Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-501 (1995) (a defendant is presumed innocent until each element 
of the offense "is proved beyond a reasonable doubt", and 
"element of the offense" means: "the culpable mental state 
required") squares with that proposition. The state also fails 
to identify how a Section 76-3-203.1 proceeding is analogous to a 
pretrial proceeding concerning the admissibility of evidence. 
(Compare § 76-3-203.1 to laws referenced in note 3, supra.) 
Sentencing laws analogous to Utah's gang-enhancement statute 
include the dangerous weapon enhancement, the habitual criminal 
statues, and the aggravating circumstances that must be proved in 
a capital case. Utah law provides for a jury determination and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in connection with those 
The state has cited to the following laws and principles to show 
that courts routinely find facts by proof below the reasonable doubt 
standard (Br. Appellee at 14-15): 
(1) Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence, which requires the court 
to determine preliminary fact questions "concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a 
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence"; 
(2) The proposition that the court must determine the 
voluntariness of a confession as a preliminary question relevant to 
the admissibility into evidence of the confession, State v. Hinton, 
680 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1984) (citing Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 477 
(1972) (the Sixth Amendment right to a jury does not change the 
normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a question for the 
court rather than the jury)); and 
(3) The propositions embodied in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) 
that the "existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of 
the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence." 
It is fundamental jurisprudence that trial courts are the exclusive 
finders of fact with regard to such preliminary evidentiary and 
jurisdictional issues. 
10 
enhancements and aggravators. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 
(Supp. 1995) (dangerous weapon enhancement); Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-1001, et seq. (1995) (habitual criminal statutes); State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 577-80, 585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, 
Durham, and Zimmerman, JJ., in separate opinions, collectively 
holding that aggravating circumstances are elements of the crime 
which the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Section 76-3-203.1 serves a purpose similar to them. The same 
right to a jury and heightened standard of proof should apply. 
Because the legislature has written those safeguards out of the 
statute, it must be stricken as unconstitutional. 
Similarly, the state asserts that "because Section 76-3-
203.1 is a sentencing statute only, the procedure by which it 
applies is relaxed." (Br. Appellee at 15.) However, once the 
specific intent element is read into the statute, Utah law 
entitles the defendant to the presumption of innocence and to a 
jury on that element. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) and (2) 
(1995). Whether Section 76-3-203.1 is viewed as a "sentencing 
statute only" (Br. Appellee at 15) or a separate offense, the 
defendant is entitled to more process than that which is due in 
traditional sentencings and provided in the statute. Because the 
legislature has denied a defendant that due process, the statute 
is unconstitutional. (See Br. Appellant at 31-36.) 
POINT II. THE STATE'S OPPOSITION TO THE VAGUENESS 
CHALLENGE LOOSES STEAM IN THE WAKE OF ITS INABILITY TO 
DEFINE HOW "IN CONCERT" CONDUCT MUST BE PROVED. 
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A. POINT ONE OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF ACKNOWLEDGES THE 
VAGUENESS ISSUES THAT EXIST IN SECTION 76-3-203.1 WITH 
THE PHRASE "IN CONCERT." 
In Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that acting "in concert" does not require the state to 
prove that the persons involved in the criminal conduct had the 
same mental state as the defendant. " [T]hree persons can be 
parties to the same criminal conduct and each have a different 
mental state." Id. The ruling does not address how "in concert" 
conduct must be proved against the defendant.4 (See Point I, 
4
 The state asserts Cheeney's challenge on vagueness grounds lacks 
merit because the statute was not vague "as applied to him." (Br. 
Appellee at 20.) In addition the state claims, "Cheeney's co-
perpetrators were neither unidentified nor uncharged; Cheeney himself 
identified them when he confessed to police, and both co-perpetrators 
were charged (R. 8, 12)." (Br. Appellee at 20.) Those assertions are 
incorrect. 
In the lower court proceedings, Cheeney appeared at sentencing, 
represented by counsel, and the matter of his sentence was subjected to 
adversarial testing. (R. 109-30.) For whatever reason, the state failed 
to present evidence concerning the existence of co-defendants or 
uncharged other actors. (See R. 109-30.) During colloquy on the 
conditional plea, and as a condition of that plea, Cheeney was required 
to acknowledge that the elements of the charged offenses were satisfied, 
including the elements of 76-3-203.1. (See R. 115-16, 125.) 
Specifically, the trial court in this matter asked Cheeney whether he 
engaged in the crime in question with "one or more persons additionally" 
(R. 125) . Although the prosecutor attempted to correct the trial court 
(id.), it is not clear that the trial court adopted the correction. 
(Id.) Thus, the record does not contain a clear admission on the part 
of Cheeney that the pled offenses were committed "in concert" with two 
or more persons. In addition, during sentencing, the trial court made 
occasional references to only one other person, Cheeney's "friend, if not 
co-gang member, Rasmussen." (R. 142.) The evidence is insufficient to 
support a finding that two or more other actors were involved in the 
offenses pled in this case. 
The total of what was before the judge concerning in concert conduct 
consisted of the Information, which charged "Bryan O. Rasmussen aka Brian 
Anderson" and "Michael Chad Hoffman aka Michael C. Watkins Chad Schmidt" 
as defendants. (R. 8-12.) The state cited to the Information as 
evidence of Cheeney's alleged "confession." (Br. Appellee at 20.) In 
so doing, the state overlooked the fact that while Cheeney entered the 
conditional plea in this matter only in connection with the "Sundance 
Institute" burglary and theft (R. 27-36), he specifically disavowed in 
(continued...) 
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supra.) In dealing with that issue, the state suggests Cheeney's 
reference to the legislative history is inappropriate, because 
the phrase, "in concert," 
puts normally intelligent persons on adequate notice of 
the conditions that will trigger the enhancement. 
Because the statute is unambiguous on its face, it is 
unnecessary and improper to use legislative history to 
interpret it. The statute plainly enhances penalties 
for crimes committed "in concert" with others. Nothing 
more (and nothing less) may be read into it. 
(Br. Appellee at 20.) The state's position is incorrect for 
three reasons. First, the phrase "in concert" is ambiguous: (1) 
the state urges this Court to interpret Section 76-3-203.1 as a 
strict liability statute, although neither the plain language nor 
4(...continued) 
his alleged "confession" that those offenses were committed in concert 
with two or more other persons. According to the Information, Cheeney 
allegedly confessed to the following: "After being informed of his 
constitutional rights and freely agreeing to speak without an attorney 
present, defendant Cheeney admitted to all of the above conduct and that 
defendant Rasmussen had been involved with him. Defendant Cheeney also 
admitted that defendant Hoffman was involved in all but the Sundance 
Institute burglary and theft." (R. 12 (emphasis added).) Criminal 
informations are not evidence, and if put to the admissibility test, 
would suffer multiple hearsay and reliability problems. Further, Cheeney 
and Rasmussen did not enter pleas of guilty on the same burglary and 
theft charges. Even if they had, the state is still one actor short of 
showing "action with two or more persons" on those charges. Fully 
marshaled, there is insufficient evidence to support imposition of the 
gang enhancement here. The record fails to support that Cheeney and two 
others committed the underlying offenses "in concert". 
In addition, as a condition of the plea agreement, in exchange for 
Cheeney's acknowledgment that all elements of the specifically-pled 
charges were satisfied, the state agreed that Cheeney could challenge the 
statute under numerous constitutional provisions, including the due 
process provision of the federal constitution. The trial court accepted 
the conditional plea. The state's claim that Cheeney now has "no 
complaint" under the void-for-vagueness analysis, or that he failed to 
run the full course of trial and sentencing to show that the statute was 
unconstitutional "as applied" against him, is inconsistent with State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Rule ll(i), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The Sery plea preserved the issues for appeal. The 
state cannot in good faith be allowed to disregard the agreement and re-
define the appealable issues. (See Point V, infra.) 
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the legislative history of the statute support such an 
interpretation; and (2) the phrase "in concert" supports the 
determination that the state must establish a culpable mental 
state, but fails to identify the level of culpability that must 
be proved before the enhancement may be applied. (See Point I, 
supra-) Since the phrase "in concert" as used in § 76-3-203.1 is 
facially vague, it is proper to consider legislative intent. 
Second, even if the language of Section 76-3-203.1 was 
clear, the statute must be construed in accordance with 
legislative intent. 
The fundamental consideration which transcends all 
others in regard to the interpretation and application 
of a statute is: What was the intent of the 
legislature?" All other rules of statutory 
construction are subordinate to it and are helpful only 
insofar as they assist in attaining that objective. In 
determining that intent the statute should be 
considered in the light of the purpose it was designed 
to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if 
that can be done consistent with its language. 
Johnson v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966) 
(footnote and cites omitted); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 
568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); accord Cullum v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993) ("A court's primary 
responsibility in interpreting a statute 'is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature,' [ ], and rules of statutory 
interpretation exist only to assist in this determination"); 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("This 
Court's primary responsibility in construing legislation is to 
give effect to the intent of the legislature"); Young v. Barney, 
433 P.2d 846, 847 (Utah 1967) ("In any inquiry concerning the 
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application of a rule or a statute to a given situation the 
primary objective is to discover the intent and purpose for which 
it was enacted"). 
Indeed, the literal language of § 76-3-203.1 must give way 
to the unequivocally expressed intent of the legislature. This 
Court has noted: 
[flO]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory 
construction is that the statute should be looked at as 
a whole and in light of the general purpose it was 
intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and 
applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to 
give the statute the implementation which will fulfill 
its purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail 
over technically applied literalness.["] Andrus v. 
Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (1965). 
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Church 
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), 
the United States Supreme Court held: 
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the 
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit nor within the intention 
of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the 
Reports are full of cases illustrating its application. 
This is not the substitution of the will of the judge 
for that of the legislator; for frequently words of 
general meaning are used in a statute, words broad 
enough to include an act in question, and yet a 
consideration of the whole legislation, or of the 
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the 
absurd results which follow from giving such broad 
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe 
that the legislator intended to include the particular 
act. 
The Supreme Court was interpreting a statute which read: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, 
partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, 
to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or 
encourage the importation or migration, of any alien or 
aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United 
States, its territories, or the District of Columbia, 
under contract or agreement, parol or special, express 
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or implied, made previous to the importation or 
migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or 
foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in 
the United States, its territories, or the District of 
Columbia. 
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458. Despite the plain 
language of the statute, the Court held it inapplicable to the 
church, which had arranged for the transport of an Englishman to 
serve as rector and pastor at a church in New York City. The 
legislative history made clear that "the intent of congress was 
simply to stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor." Id. 
at 465; in accord. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 
489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); National R. R. Passenger Corp. v. 
National Ass'n of R. R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) 
("[E]ven the most basic general principles of statutory 
construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative 
intent"); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 
(1940): 
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did 
not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable 
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the 
legislation as a whole' [] this Court has followed that 
purpose, rather than the literal words. [] When aid to 
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the 
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule 
of law' which forbids its use, [] however clear the 
words may appear on 'superficial examination.'" 
Id. at 543-4 1064 (footnotes and cites omitted); Harrison v. 
Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) (" [T]here is wisely 
no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative 
history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on "superficial 
examination"'"); see also Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma 
Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); United States v. Universal 
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C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952) ("Instead of balancing 
the various generalized axioms of experience in construing 
legislation, regard for the specific history of the legislative 
process that culminated in the Act now before us affords more 
solid ground for giving it appropriate meaning"). 
Third, in support of its position concerning legislative 
history, the state cites to Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 
850 n. 14 (Utah 1994), which concerns the use of legislative 
history in construing constitutional provisions. In this matter, 
Cheeney is not seeking simple interpretation of Section 76-3-
203.1. See Kearns-Tribune Corp. and KUTV v. Hornak, Case No. 
960265 (Utah May 7, 1996). Rather, Cheeney is leveling a 
constitutional challenge against the statute. Courts 
traditionally review the legislative history of statutes 
challenged on vagueness and due process grounds. See U.S. v. 
Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Information 
Providers7 Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. 
F.C.C., 928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991). 
In this matter, the undisputed underlying intent of Section 
76-3-203.1 is that the statute applies only to criminal street 
gang members acting in concert. (Br. Appellant at 10-11; R. 77-
86.) Since the language of the statute obscures the gang-related 
purpose, Section 76-3-203.1 fails to give a person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know that such conduct 
is prohibited. The statute suffers from an added layer of 
ambiguity. Thus, even if the "in concert" provision is more 
clearly defined to include a culpable mental state, the statute 
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has not attained its true intent and purpose. 
B. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION, CHEENEY IS NOT 
COMPLAINING ABOUT JUDICIAL DISCRETION, BUT CHALLENGES 
THE STATUTE BECAUSE IT FAILS TO GUIDE JUDGES IN THE 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW (NOT THE SENTENCE). 
The state incorrectly claims, "[Cheeney] asserts that the 
statute grants too much discretion to sentencing judges." (Br. 
Appellee at 21.) Cheeney is not challenging the trial court's 
discretion in the discreet area of post-conviction sentencing --
Cheeney is challenging the capricious, discriminatory and 
arbitrary manner in which trial courts may apply the law to 
determine who (of the pool of like-minded convicted felons) may 
be subjected to an enhanced penalty and who (of that same pool) 
will be sentenced under the provisions only of the underlying 
offense. The difference is not one of discretion, but of 
discrimination. 
The state asserts that the statute "cabins" the "judge's 
discretion by creating a strong presumption that once the 'in 
concert' condition is found to exist, the enhancement will 
apply." (Br. Appellee at 22.) That assertion begs a series of 
questions -- How does the judge apply the law to determine the 
predicate crime was conducted "in concert"? Does the judge apply 
a bright line test or a strict liability standard, or require 
proof of "common design", "plan" or "purpose", and what is the 
standard of proof? Will the judge focus on gang members as 
intended by the legislature, and if so, how will the judge ferret 
out others? The courts are given large nets with multitudes of 
choices inviting arbitrary and capricious application of the 
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statute. (See Br. Appellant at 25-28.) 
C. THE AMBIGUITY CREATED BY THE PHRASE "IN CONCERT" 
CONDUCT DIRECTLY IMPAIRS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
PARTICULARLY IF THE COURT EMPLOYS A STRICT LIABILITY 
STANDARD TO ITS APPLICATION. 
The state has misconstrued that portion of Cheeney's initial 
brief concerning the manner in which Section 76-3-203.1 impairs 
First Amendment rights of association. (Br. Appellee at 23.) 
Cheeney acknowledged in his brief that citizens do not have the 
right to assemble to commit crimes. (Br. Appellant at 28.) 
Cheeney is not advocating for that right. 
As set forth in Cheeney's initial brief, because Section 76-
3-203.1 contains vague terms, the statute serves to chill the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. The state has asked this 
Court to "reject Cheeney's argument" that "proof burdens are 
required" under Section 76-3-203.1, and to rule that the 
prosecutor is not required to show "in concert" conduct with 
circumstantial or actual evidence of the defendant's culpability. 
Under such a strict liability standard, the mere existence of two 
other persons in the vicinity of the crime would satisfy the 
bright line test and subject the defendant to an enhanced penalty 
for the predicate offense. Application of such a standard is 
inconsistent with Utah law and creates an unconstitutional 
presumption. See Elton, 680 P.2d at 727; McFarland, 241 U.S. at 
79. Such a presumption fuels the proposition that Section 76-3-
203.1 violates First Amendment freedoms of association, since a 
defendant, who has committed one of the predicate crimes but 
never intended or believed that his friends or associates were 
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likewise involved in the act, may be subjected to an enhanced 
penalty because of his mere association with others. 
POINT III. THE STATE IMPROPERLY SEEKS TO SHIFT THE 
BURDEN ON THE DEFENDANT IN A PRELIMINARY HEARING 
CONCERNING §76-3-203.1 ISSUES. 
The state claims that Cheeney's argument under Art. I, sec. 
13 of the Utah Constitution was "affirmatively waived." (Br. 
Appellee at 8, 17-19.) Even if Cheeney originally waived the 
preliminary hearing issues, the trial court's action in 
addressing the issue on the merits revives the claim. State v. 
Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) ("Because the court 
considered the alleged error rather than finding it waived, 
Seale's right to assert the issue on appeal was resuscitated"), 
cert, denied, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993); State v. Belcrard, 830 P.2d 
264, 266 (Utah 1992); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 
1991); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991). 
Cheeney's argument concerning Art. I, sec. 13 is contained 
in the Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement (R. 4 0-48), and the 
state's opposition on the merits is in the record at 54. 
Further, the trial court denied the Motion to Strike Gang 
Enhancement "for the reasons specified in the opposing 
memorandum." (R. 71 and 54.) No waiver has occurred. 
In addition, in exchange for Cheeney's guilty plea on the 
burglary and theft counts, the state specifically agreed that 
Cheeney could appeal the constitutionality of Section 76-3-203.1. 
(R. 36.) Cheeney relied in good faith on the representations 
made by the state as set forth in the plea agreement. Cheeney 
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maintained his end of the bargain, pled to the charges and 
elements as required under the agreement, and is serving his 
sentence in the Utah State Prison as a result of the plea 
agreement. The state cannot be permitted to re-define the 
appealable issues and should be required to abide by the terms of 
the plea agreement. 
With respect to the state's assertion that "the statute 
appears to allow an 'in concert' inquiry at [a] preliminary 
hearing" (Br. Appellee at 18), such an "appearance" is 
sufficiently unclear so as to raise vagueness and ambiguity 
concerns. In addition, the state suggests that the defendant has 
the opportunity at the preliminary hearing to make an "in 
concert" inquiry, thereby satisfying Art. I, sec. 13. (Id.) The 
state attempts to shift the burden on the defendant of raising 
the issues that are subject to examination by the magistrate at 
the preliminary hearing. Such burden shifting is inappropriate. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(1). Defendants cannot be expected or 
required to raise and then disprove in a preliminary hearing the 
elements of the offense charged by the state. In order for the 
state to proceed with charges against a defendant the state must 
make an adequate probable cause showing that passes constitu-
tional muster. 
POINT IV. CHEENEY IS NOT SEEKING "DEVELOPMENT" OF THE 
UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION SINCE UTAH COURTS HAVE ALREADY DEFINED THE 
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES. 
Again, the state has asserted Cheeney's arguments under 
specific constitutional provisions, particularly Art. I, sec. 24, 
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were waived. (Br. Appellee at 24.) As set forth in Point III, 
above, any waiver by Cheeney was revived in connection with the 
Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement. (R. 40-48.) In a memorandum 
to the trial court to uphold the constitutionality of Section 76-
3-203.1, the prosecutor in this matter disavowed concerns with 
the statute under the federal equal protection provision and the 
state uniform operation of laws provision. The prosecutor stated 
that selective enforcement of criminal laws does not violate 
constitutional principles unless it is shown that the process was 
"deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification" (R. 51); and 
advocated the utilization of the "rational relationship" analysis 
defined in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582 (Utah 1993), a case 
reviewed under Art. I, sec. 24. (R. 52 and 53.) Thereafter, the 
trial court denied the Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement "for the 
reasons specified in the opposing memorandum" (R. 71), thereby 
preserving equal protection and Art. I, sec. 24 issues for appeal 
purposes. 
Consistent with Lee and Utah's Art. I, sec. 24 cases, 
Cheeney has asked this Court to review Section 76-3-203.1 under 
developed state constitutional principles. (Br. Appellant at 37-
44); see Lee, 867 P.2d at 582; State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 
(Utah 1989) (strict scrutiny test is used if a challenged 
classification is "suspect" or if a "fundamental interest" is 
involved); Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 356, 
358 (Utah 1989); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) 
(under Art. I, sec. 24, classifications "must be based on 
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differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute"). 
With respect to the state's claim that Cheeney's Art. I, 
sec. 24 argument fails because he relies upon false premises, as 
set forth above, the state is incorrect. Among other things, the 
state asserts a strict liability standard applies to Section 76-
3-203.1. In addition, the statute is not true to its legislative 
intent. Strict-liability application of the statute, without 
consideration for the legislative intent, is unconstitutional and 
impedes First Amendment freedoms of association. Since First 
Amendment rights are "fundamental rights", the statute must be 
analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard as set forth in 
Cheeney's initial brief. (Br. Appellant at 40-41.) The state 
fails to oppose Cheeney's analysis under that standard. Rather, 
the state asserts the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest. Since the state interest identified 
by the legislative history has no relation to the statute, the 
state's argument rings hollow. (See Br. Appellant at 30, 42-44.) 
POINT V. THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL ARE PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Finally, the state has peppered its brief with additional 
general and specific allegations that Cheeney has "waived" his 
constitutional challenges to Section 76-3-203.1, and cannot 
assert the challenges because he has not proved that the statute 
was unconstitutional as applied against him. (Br. Appellee at 6, 
7.) By those assertions, the state suggests the conditional plea 
agreement is not in force, that Cheeney was required to proceed 
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with the guilt phase of a trial, then follow with insufficient 
sentencing procedures since Section 76-3-203.1 denies a defendant 
adequate due process, in order to preserve the issues raised in 
this appeal. 
In this case, the nature of the conditional plea agreement, 
which was accepted by the trial court, was such that Cheeney 
reasonably believed the constitutional challenges were preserved 
for purposes of this appeal. (R. 27-36.) The state should be 
estopped from attacking Cheeney7s challenges on waiver and "as 
applied" grounds, specifically where the issues in question were 
raised to the trial court by Cheeney and the state in connection 
with the Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Cheeney respectfully requests that 
this Court strike the gang enhancement statute as being 
unconstitutional. 
SUBMITTED this <3/^L day of <^ZLu^^ , 1996. 
LINDA M. JONES / 
REBECCA HYDE U 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 1 
APPENDIX C 
UNIFORM FINE/BAIL SCHEDULE 
NARRATIVE EXPLANATION OF SCHEDULE. 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT. 
GENERAL DISPOSITION MATRIX — FELONIES. 
GENERAL DISPOSITION MATRLX — MISDEMEANORS. 
SURCHARGE CHART. 
UNIFORM FINE/BAIL SCHEDULE. 
Chapter I. Traffic Violations. 
Chapter II. Criminal Violations. 
Chapter HI. Wildlife Resources Violations. 
Chapter IV. Boating/Parks and Recreation Violations. 
Chapter V. Common Motor Carrier Violations. 
Overload Bail Schedule. 
Compiler's Notes. — Former Appendix C, cedures, has been deleted as an appendix to 
Utah State Courts Personnel Policies and Pro- this Code. 
UNIFORM FINE/BAIL SCHEDULE 
PURPOSE: 
It is the intent of the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule to provide assistance to the 
sentencing judge in determining the appropriate Cine or bail to be assessed in 
a particular case and to minimize disparity of fines/bails imposed by different 
courts for similar offenses. This schedule is not intended to deprive nor minize 
the authority of the court to impose a sentence deemed just in the discretion of 
the judge. 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
The penalty for all public offenses should include a financial sanction as a 
minimum base from which the judge may determine the total sentence, de-
pendent upon aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances of an individual 
case. 
The cumulative effect of appropriate penalties such as probation, community 
service, surcharges, restitution, victim reparation, rehabilitation treatment 
programs, home confinement, court costs and periods of incarceration, should 
constitute the total sentence. 
The enhancement or reduction to the basic fine should reflect the severity of 
the offense, the extent of victim injury or property damage loss, the risk which 
the offender poses to society, the offender's criminal and person history, and 
related factors. (Specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances are set 
forth on pages C and D.) 
APPLICATION: 
Use of Bail/Fine Columns. 
The bail column is used only to set bail to ensure defendant's appearance. 
The fine column is used if the defendant is convicted either through trial, 
guilty plea, or voluntary forfeiture of bail (in those cases where bail forfeiture 
disposes of the case). 
Surcharge. 
63-63a-l, U.C.A. provides that "A surcharge shall be paid on all criminal 
fines, penalties and forfeitures imposed by the courts. The surcharge shall be 
85% upon conviction of a felony, class A misdemeanor, violation of Article 5, 
Chapter 6, Title 41, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, or any 
class B misdemeanor not classified within Title 41, including violation of 
1224 
1225 UNIFORM FINE/BAIL SCHEDULE Appx. C 
comparable county or municipal ordinances. The surcharge shall be 35% upon 
conviction of any offense, including violation of county or municipal ordi-
nances not subject to the 85% surcharge, except: 
(a) nonmoving traffic violations; and 
(b) when the court orders the offender to perform community service 
work in lieu of paying a fine." 
No surcharge should be imposed in non-moving traffic offenses. If an offense 
is considered "non-moving," this is indicated in the "comments" column. The 
Uniform Fine/Bail Committee has the responsibility to define which offenses 
are moving and which are non-moving. They have established definitions as 
follows: Moving violations involve an act or omission dealing with the actual 
driving of the motor vehicle, e.g.: failure to yield, speeding. Non-moving viola-
tions encompass status or conditions of the vehicle or driver license violations, 
e.g.: not registered, not licensed, broken equipment. 
If the fine column indicates a dollar amount, that amount INCLUDES the 
appropriate surcharge. Do not add any additional surcharge. 
If the fine column indicates "see matrix," the judge should refer to the 
matrix on page G for misdemeanors and on page F for felonies. The dollar 
amounts in the matrix DO NOT INCLUDE any surcharge. An 85% surcharge 
should be added to any fine imposed from the matrix. 
See charts starting on page H to assist in figuring the surcharge. 
Application to Adults/Juveniles. 
Since bail is not an option to a Utah juvenile, the juvenile portion of the 
schedule is the suggested FINE for that offense. The Juvenile Court does 
allow a youth, for some minor offenses, with the consent of his/her parent or 
guardian, to post the fine by mail without appearing. Also, by Juvenile Court 
rule, probation officers who conduct preliminary inquiries of new cases, can 
allow youth to pay a fixed sum to the court in lieu of a petititon being filed and 
a court hearing, if the facts of the case are admitted and both the parents and 
youth consent to the arrangement. (Rule of Judicial Administration 7-301) 
This schedule should serve as the parameter within which these actions are 
taken. 
If no amount is indicated on the juvenile schedule, the amount indicated on 
the adult schedule should be used. 
"Comments" apply to both the adult and juvenile schedule. 
General Disposition Matrices. 
The felony matrix and misdemeanor matrix are guidelines for setting FINE 
after adjudication of a case requiring a mandatory appearance. The matrices 
include a broad range of fines from the statutory maximum to a base mini-
mum within each category of offense. They are to be used in conjunction with 
the criminal history assessment criteria, which are listed below. From the 
base financial sanction in each category, the schedules provide an escalation 
of the fine in correlation with the points accumulated in the criminal history 
criteria. The matrices also specify where incarceration is likely to be appropri-
ate in addition to the fine. Presentence investigation reports prepared by 
Adult Probation and Parole Division will include the criminal history data 
necessary to place the defendant's case on the matrix. 
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES: 
Aggravating Circumstances. 
Consider aggravating circumstances only if they are not an element of the 
offense. 
1. Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct. 
2. Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
3. Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
4. Injury to person or property was unusually extensive. 
5. Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity. 
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6. There were multiple charges or victims. 
7. Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less restric-
tive setting. 
8. Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest. 
9. Other (specify) . 
Mitigating Circumstances. 
1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious 
harm. 
2. Offender acted under strong provocation. 
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal behav-
ior, though failing to establish a defense. 
4. Offender is young. 
5. Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other crimes. 
6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
7. Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
8. Crime victim does not want defendant to be incarcerated. 
9. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family relation-
ships. 
10. Imprisonment or amount of fine would entail excessive hardship on 
offender or dependents. 
11. Other (specify) 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT 
The attached criminal disposition matrix classifies a person's criminal his-
tory in 5 categories from excellent (0-3 points), good (4-7 points), moderate 
(8-11 points), fair (12-15 points) and poor (16-28 points). The appropriate clas-
sification is determined by scores obtained by summing points assessed in 
each of the six criteria as follows: 
1. Prior Felony Conviction(s); up to 8 points if a person has more than 3 
felony convictions. 
2. Prior Misdemeanor Conviction(s); up to 4 points if a person has more 
than 7 misdemeanor convictions. 
3. Prior Juvenile Referrals; up to 4 points if the person was committed 
to a secure facility or 3 points if the collection of felonies and misde-
meanors exceeded 4 counting felonies as 1 and misdemeanors as Vs. 
4. Supervision History; up to 4 points depending on the prior level of 
supervision in either the juvenile or adult system and revocation history. 
5. Supervision Risk; up to 4 points based on previous reporting, ab-
sconding or escape history. 
6. Weapons Enhancement; up to 4 points based on the use of weapons. 
Total possible points are 28, least possible 0. Aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances are also a part of the sentence and release guidelines. 
